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RESUMEN 
Según el contextualismo, la gran mayoria de las expressiones del lenguaje natural son 
sensibles al contexto. Verificar si esta alegación se refleja o no en las intuiciones de la gente 
común, suscita algunas interesantes cuestiones metodológicas como: ¿qué diseño experi-
mental es mas apropriado para poner a prueba el contextualismo, el intra-sujetos, o en co-
rrespondiente entre-sujetos? La thesis central de este artículo es que debería preferirse el 
modelo entre-sujetos. 
El primer experimento aspira a evaluar la diferencia entre los resultados consegui-
dos para las mediciones intra-sujetos (donde todos los partecipantes evaluan todos los 
contextos) y para las mediciones entre-sujetos (donde los encuestados que evaluan dife-
rentes contextos son divididos en grupos diferentes). Se muestra que el modelo intra-
sujetos proporciona datos que parecen respaldar el contextualismo. Sin embargo, yo pre-
sento una interpretación alternativa y invariantista de estos resultados, mostrando enton-
ces que el modelo intra-subjetos no permite distinguir entre contextualismo e 
invariantismo. El segundo experimento elabora adicionalmente la cuestión de cómo per-
cibir el contraste entre los contextos puede afectar a los juicios de los sujetos. Muestro 
que algunos tipos de contextos pueden provocar intuiciónes opuestas cuando se contras-
tan con diferentes contextos.  
 
PALABRAS-CLAVE: contexstualismo, invariantismo, filosofía experimental, metodología, modelo expe-
rimental, intra-sujetos, entre-sujetos. 
 
ABSTRACT 
According to contextualism, vast majority of natural-language expressions are con-
text-sensitive. When testing whether this claim is reflected in Folk intuitions, some inter-
esting methodological questions were raised such as: which experimental design is more 
appropriate for testing contextualism – the within- or the between-subject design? The 
main thesis of this paper is that the between-subject design should be preferred. 
The first experiment aims at assessing the difference between the results obtained 
for within-subjects measurements (where all participants assess all contexts) and be-
tween-subject measurements (where respondents evaluating different contexts are dis-
tinct groups). It is shown that the within-subject design provides data that seems to 
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support contextualism. However, I present an alternative, invariantist interpretation of 
these results, therefore showing that the within-subject design does not allow to empiri-
cally distinguish between contextualism and invariantism. The second experiment further 
elaborates the issue of how perceiving the contrast between contexts can affect subjects’ 
judgments – I show that certain kinds of contexts may elicit opposite intuitions when 
contrasted with different contexts.  
 
KEYWORDS: Contextualism, Invariantism, Experimental Philosophy, Methodology, Experimental 
Design, Within-Subjects, Between-Subjects. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Contextualists claim that context-sensitivity is a widespread phe-
nomenon in natural language, i.e. they believe that the conversational 
context in which a certain expression is uttered is very likely to affect the 
meaning of that expression. Thus, according to them, a given sentence, 
when used in different conversational contexts, usually expresses differ-
ent propositions. On the other hand, inviariantists (also known as ‘min-
imalists’) argue that the meaning of most natural language expressions 
remains stable across contexts. They agree that there are some obviously 
context-sensitive terms, like indexicals (e.g. ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘tomorrow’), but 
they also claim that if a sentence does not contain such terms, it express-
es the same proposition in each utterance, regardless of the conversa-
tional context.1  
In recent years, the discussion between contextualists and invariant-
ists has moved in a new direction. Philosophers started seeking evidence 
to support of one of these views. Evidence that had not been previously 
put forward by their proponents. This new direction relies on methods 
of philosophizing introduced by experimental philosophers, according to 
whom we can gain new insights and formulate new arguments based on 
systematic empirical studies of folk intuitions. Since the supporters of con-
textualism offered many diverse cases that are supposed to elicit intuitions 
in favor of their view, there is a rich source of thought experiments that 
can be adopted in experimental studies on contextualism. 
Contextualist thought experiments usually focus on describing pairs 
of conversational contexts in which a certain sentence is uttered by some 
speaker. Their authors argue that the difference in context affects the 
truth conditions of the utterance in question; which favors their view 
over invariantism. Experimental philosophers are interested in checking 
whether this crucial claim would be in fact reflected in folk judgments 
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regarding contextualist thought experiments or, more specifically, in folk 
verdicts concerning truth-conditions of sentences uttered in different 
contexts. Importantly, there are two different ways of adopting contex-
tualist thought experiments in empirical studies – subjects evaluating dif-
ferent contexts may be in separate groups (between-subject design) or 
both contexts can be presented to all subjects, giving them the oppor-
tunity to see the contrast between contexts when forming their judgments 
(within-subject design). Recently some philosophers (Hansen, Chemla, 
2013; Hansen, 2014) argued that the latter approach is more suitable for 
providing conclusive data regarding the contextualism-invatiantism debate.  
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the difference between 
the two abovementioned alternative experimental designs in case of 
studies concerning contextualism. Contrary to H&C,2 I argue that the 
between-subject design is more appropriate for experiments examining 
folk intuitions about the influence of conversational context on the 
meaning of expressions. I provide reasons to believe that, in fact, the 
within-subject design tends to elicit judgments more favorable to contex-
tualism than the between-subject design. However, I also claim that this 
effect can be explained as a result of an influence of factors different 
than the conversational context. Therefore, the alleged additional sup-
port to contextualism observed in within-subject experiments should not 
be considered relevant to the discussed issue. In my argumentation I re-
fer to results of my own experiments. I also show that nevertheless, even 
for the between-subject design, the data collected in my experiments 
confirm contextualists’ predictions to a degree that cannot be ignored. 
The first section sketches the background for my experiments. 
Firstly, I discuss the way of delineating between contextualism and invar-
iantism that corresponds to the methods used in experimental philoso-
phy to test which view receives more support from folk judgments. 
Secondly, I briefly summarize the results of previous studies regarding 
contextualism, focusing mostly on the H&C experiment, their methodo-
logical proposal and arguments they present in favor of it. 
In the second section, I report the results of my first study which 
examines the difference in folk judgments for contextualist thought ex-
periments tested in within- and between-subject designs.  
The third section focuses on the data collected in my second study, 
which shows that there are conversational contexts that are evaluated 
differently depending on whether they are contrasted with some other 
contexts or assessed independently. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
II. 1. How does Experimental Philosophy Distinguish Between Contextualism 
and Invariantism? 
One can choose different criteria to draw the distinction between 
contextualism and invariantism (sometimes also referred to as ‘minimal-
ism’). It is possible for one account under a certain criterion to count as 
invariantist, while according to another criterion be classified as contex-
tualist. As an example, let us consider Jason Stanley’s (2005) Interest Rel-
ative Invariantism (IRI), whose main claim is that the truth-value of 
knowledge ascriptions may depend on the practical interest of the agent 
to whom the knowledge is being attributed. If we decide to classify views 
by asking whether the account in question allows sentences to express 
propositions outside of the conversational context, IRI would be in fact 
counted among invariantist theories, since IRI claims that each 
knowledge attribution expresses the same complete proposition in every 
context. A view that would be classified as contextualist on this criterion 
is, for example, the one defended by François Recanati in Truth Conditional 
Pragmatics (2010). However, if we choose a criterion pointing at how often 
pragmatic (contextual) factors influence the truth-value of utterances ac-
cording to the view in question, IRI would have to be classified as a con-
textualist view, because, according to Stanley, such an influence is a 
widespread phenomenon in cases of knowledge attributions. An example 
of an account that counts as invariantism on this criterion is the view 
proposed by Cappelen and Lepore (2005). 
Most experimental philosophy studies concerning contextualism fo-
cus on the latter method of delineating between the rival theories in ques-
tion. On one hand, invariantist views are the ones according to which 
context-sensitivity is a relatively rare phenomenon, restricted to well-
known cases such as indexicals or demonstratives. On the other hand, 
contextualist accounts are the ones that predict that context-sensitivity is 
a common trait of expressions. Therefore, experimental philosophers’ in-
terest in contextualism usually aims at establishing whether folk judg-
ments regarding truth value of sentences vary with conversational 
context in which the assessed sentence is uttered. In order to achieve this 
goal, they ask the participants of their experiments to evaluate pairs of 
vignettes, each describing a different conversational context in which the 
same sentence is being used by a speaker (from now on I will refer to 
such pairs as ‘scenarios’). These compared vignettes are constructed in 
such a way that while contextualists would predict a shift in the truth-
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value of the utterance in question (due to contextual influence on truth 
conditions), invariantists would have to claim that the truth-value (and 
meaning) remains constant, because the only thing that makes the vi-
gnettes different is the conversational context. For the sake of clarity, let 
us from now on call contexts in which contextualists predict negative 
judgments ‘rejection contexts’ and the ones in case of which they predict 
positive judgments – ‘acceptance contexts’.  
Since the participants of experiments are asked to provide judg-
ments about the truth-value of the crucial utterances, the method of 
measuring their intuitions about the influence of context on meaning is 
indirect, based on a widely shared opinion that reference is determined 
by meaning. The difference of subjects’ judgments concerning the truth-
value of the utterance in question between contexts can be interpreted as 
empirical evidence for contextualism. Unfortunately, lack of such differ-
ences is not enough to provide support to invariantism – note that it is 
possible to link different meanings with different uses of a sentence and 
still reasonably claim that the truth-value of that sentence is identical in 
both cases. Therefore, most experimental work on the discussed issue 
focuses more on contextualism than on invariantism. The studies de-
signed along the lines of the approach described above are sometimes 
called context shifting experiments. 
 
II. 2. Results of Previous Studies Concerning Contextualism 
Most experiments carried out so far have focused on context-
dependence of knowledge ascriptions [e.g. Buckwalter (2010); May et al., 
(2010); Feltz and Zarpentine (2010); Pinillos (2011); Sripada and Stanley 
(2012)], and based on famous Bank Cases first introduced to the litera-
ture by Keith DeRose (1992). DeRose constructed these cases to illus-
trate and argue for his version of epistemic contextualism. According to 
DeRose the meaning of the predicate ‘…know that…’ depends on what 
is at stake and how salient the possibility of error is (both factors are 
constituents of the conversational context). However, what needs to be 
stressed is that not all studies mentioned above explicitly aimed at 
providing data on epistemic contextualism; but rather on Interest Rela-
tive Invariantism. Nevertheless, the way context shifting experiments 
distinguish between invariantism and contextualism classifies both 
DeRose and Stanley as supporters of contextualism, because their views 
predict a shift in truth-evaluations between certain contexts.3 
A lot of interesting work has been done on the topic of context-
dependence of knowledge attributions. I will not discuss these results in 
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details here. Instead, I will focus on experiments seeking support for 
contextualism as a broader view that suggests widespread context-
dependence of many other expressions, not only knowledge ascriptions. 
However, two things about the experiments on knowledge attributions 
need to be pointed out. Firstly, majority of previous studies on this issue 
failed to provide strong support to epistemic contextualism (or IRI) – folk 
judgments regarding knowledge ascriptions were either completely in-
sensitive to stakes and salience of error, or the influence of these factors 
on judgments was marginal, and far from shifting the subjects’ verdicts 
from positive to negative. Secondly, and what is most important for the 
issue discussed in this paper, the data collected in some experiments 
show that conducting the experiment in within-subject design usually in-
creases the magnitude of the observed difference in judgments across 
contexts in comparison to studies utilizing the between-subject design 
[see for example May et al. (2010)]. 
Based on this observation, Nat Hansen and Emmanuel Chemla 
(2013) carried out a complex study testing many different contextualist 
scenarios using a within-subject design. The participants of their experi-
ments assessed ten cases – four knowledge scenarios (testing context-
sensitivity of the predicate ‘…know that…’), four color scenarios (testing 
context-sensitivity of adjectives describing colors) and two ‘miscellane-
ous’ scenarios in case of which the expected context-sensitivity cannot 
be clearly classified. Following DeRose’s (2011) suggestions, H&C de-
cided to present every scenario in two variants: in one variant subjects 
were asked to evaluate an affirmative claim, while in the other variant 
their task was to evaluate its negation. DeRose offered a defense strategy 
for contextualism by stipulating that lack of confirmation observed in 
previous experiments is an effect of a pragmatic phenomenon known as 
accommodation [Lewis, 1979]. It is a tendency of hearers to look for 
such an interpretation of utterances on which they turn out to be true. In 
some cases, this tendency may lead hearers to form non-standard inter-
pretations of utterances – according to DeRose that might explain sub-
jects’ positive judgments in cases where an agent ascribes knowledge to 
herself, but contextualism predicts that the context of utterance shifts 
the meaning in such a way that the ascription is false. To check these 
stipulations, H&C decided to ask their subjects to asses both affirmative 
and negative claims in both kinds of contexts in order to test whether 
DeRose’s suspicions about the role of accommodation in shaping sub-
jects’ judgments are in fact right. As a result, each scenario was presented 
to participants of their experiments in four variants, which means that 
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each context of each scenario was presented twice. In total, each partici-
pant of their study had to give 44 judgments (10 target scenarios and one 
control scenario). Their experiment was designed for 2x2 ANOVA model 
with repeated measurements including two factors: context (rejection vs. 
acceptance)4 and polarity (affirmative vs. negative claim). 
H&C designed a very interesting method aiming at randomizing the 
presentation of vignettes in an optimal manner which they refer to as 
‘block design’. Due to lack of space, I will not go into details here. How-
ever, it is worth mentioning that the block design allowed H&C to min-
imize the probability of two versions of one scenario appearing one after 
another, and extrapolate how the results would look if they used a be-
tween-subject design. 
The data H&C subjected to statistical analysis included answers 
given by 39 respondents. They argue that the results they obtained pro-
vide strong support to contextualism. In fact, subjects were much more 
likely to deny the utterances in rejection contexts than in acceptance con-
texts with regards to color and “miscellaneous” scenarios (for the posi-
tive sentences, for the negative sentences the effect direction was, of 
course, opposite). For most of these scenarios the effect size was really 
robust. On average, people rejected the utterance in one context while 
accepting it in the other. However, the results were completely different 
when it comes to knowledge scenarios. Most comparisons showed no 
significant differences between judgments for opposite contexts. This re-
sult replicates the data collected in previous experiments investigating 
folk intuitions concerning context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. 
Contrary to DeRose’s (2011) suspicions, H&C did not observe any 
symptoms of accommodation in answers given by the participants of 
their experiment. The distribution of judgments between contexts for 
positive and negative sentences was symmetrical. Interestingly, they no-
ticed a different bias in folk judgments – subjects were, on average, more 
likely to accept positive sentences than negative ones. 
Using some traits of their block design, H&C tried to extrapo-
late how the results might have looked if the participants of their exper-
iment weren’t able to perceive the contrast between contexts. In order to 
do this, they ran additional statistical analysis focusing only on answers 
given by subjects for the first presented block, which included variants of 
scenarios representing all four combinations of factors (context x polari-
ty) for knowledge and color cases, and two combinations for miscellane-
ous cases. Therefore, H&C assumed that comparing the judgments given 
in the first block can allow us to “simulate” the between-subject design 
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(although not fully, because the idea here rests on comparing judgments 
concerning different scenarios). The analysis revealed no significant dif-
ference for knowledge cases, but confirmed the existence of contextual 
effects in color and miscellaneous cases. However, the size of the ob-
tained effects was somehow smaller than in case of full-blown within-
subject measurements.  
The H&C experiment was the first study focusing on contextu-
alism that was not restricted to the issue of context-dependence of 
knowledge attributions, and the first study in which robust contextual ef-
fects were observed. Therefore, I attempted to replicate their findings for 
two scenarios in case of which the size of the observed effect was the 
most profound. Apart from the attempted replication, I also tried to 
provide better evaluation of the difference between the results one can 
obtain for the between-subject and the within-subject measurements. 
The details are discussed in the following section. 
 
 
III. FIRST STUDY 
 
III. 1. Experimental Design 
My first experiment aimed at providing further data concerning two 
cases used in the H&C study – Milk and Weight (see Appendix) – by 
comparing the sizes of the contextual effect for between- and within-
subject design. As mentioned above, such a procedure was in fact in-
cluded in the original study, but the sample size for the between-subject 
comparison was considerably small, in my experiment I checked whether 
the picture would remain the same for a bigger sample. Since H&C did 
not observe any important difference between judgments for positive 
and negative sentences that would be relevant to the contextualism-
invariantism debate (I assume that the truth-bias towards positive sen-
tences is not relevant here), all participants of my study were asked to as-
sess affirmative sentences. 
The participants of my first experiment were randomly assigned to 
either the Milk or Weight scenario. Each subject gave her judgment about 
both contexts, but, depending on random assignment, the order of 
presentation started either with the acceptance context or the rejection 
context. Different variants of scenarios were presented and evaluated 
separately. After assessing one context, subjects did not have the oppor-
tunity to change their previous answers. The design of the experiment 
for each scenario is presented in the graph below. 
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Graph 1. The experimental design for each scenario and possible ways of 
analyzing the data it can provide. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
An experimental design of this nature makes it possible to perform both 
between- and within-subject comparations on data collected in one exper-
iment. Comparing first judgments given by representatives of different 
groups (the dotted frame in the above picture), works in an analogous way 
as a full-blown between-subject design. On the other hand, collapsing the 
answers from both groups and comparing two judgments given by each 
respondent works in the exact same way as a within-subject design with 
presentation of contexts counterbalanced for order. Moreover, and most 
importantly, we can also evaluate how much of the effect size is ‘added’ in 
the within-subject design by comparing the verdicts for each context de-
pending on whether it was presented as first, or primed with the presenta-
tion of the opposite context (the dashed frame in the above picture). 
The participants of my experiment gave their judgments using a 5-
point scale, with the extremes defined as ‘true’ and false’. The crucial 
question in every experimental variant read as follows: Please evaluate the 
[protagonist name]’s claim: ‘[target sentence]’ using the scale below, where ‘1’ means 
‘false’ and ‘5’ means ‘true’.  
The survey was published online, on a website hosted by Experi-
mental Philosophy Lab (KogniLab) at the University of Warsaw <www. 
kognilab.pl>. 
Even though my study focused on the exact same scenarios as the 
one used in the H&C experiment, strictly speaking, it is not a replication 
of their study. I did not use the same experimental design (the block de-
sign), the way of measuring subjects’ verdicts was also slightly different 
(continuous vs. 5-point scale). Most importantly, their block design pre-
Group 1  
order A-R 
Group 2  
order R-A 
Context A 
Context R 
Context R 
Context A 
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vented different variants of each scenario from being presented directly 
after each other (it was possible, but highly improbable), while in my ex-
periment subjects were presented with the second variant of a scenario 
right after evaluating the first variant. However, even though my experi-
ment is not an exact replication of H&C study, the methodology I 
adopted is not different to their experiment to such an extent that would 
not allow comparing my results with their data. 
 
III. 2. PARTICIPANTS 
Subjects were recruited through the Internet by an invitation sent 
via e-mail. They were asked to forward the invitation to other people 
that might be interested in taking the survey, which created a ‘snowball 
effect’ and resulted in collecting enough data. The respondents did not 
receive any pay for their participation in the experiment.  
In total, 156 subjects filled in the survey, but only 128 answers were 
included in further statistical analysis, since 28 respondents either report-
ed having a degree in philosophy (BA or higher) or admitted not being 
English native speakers. All statistics presented below concern the probe 
containing 128 responses. 62 subjects were assigned to the Milk scenario, 
whereas 66 subjects gave their opinions about the Weight scenario. 53.9% 
of respondents were female. 46.1% of respondents were male. The aver-
age age was 33.4 years (with standard deviation of 13.7 years). The 
youngest participant was 19 years old. The eldest participant was 77 years 
old. What needs to be stressed here is that the distribution was clearly 
skewed towards younger people – majority, 70% of subjects were 20 to 
35 years old.  
 
III. 3. Results 
I analyzed the data by using a mixed ANOVA model including one 
within-subject factor (context) and one between-subject factor (order of 
context presentation), computed separately for each scenario. To test 
whether the contextual effect obtains for the between-subject measure-
ments, I ran additional independent-samples t-test comparisons. 
 
III. 3. 1. Milk 
The Milk scenario analysis revealed a significant main within-
subject effect of context, which means that when perceiving the contrast 
between contexts, subjects in fact evaluated the milk-utterance different-
ly depending on the context of utterance – F(1, 60) = 39.38; p < 0.001; 
η2 = 0.396. In accordance with contextualists’ predictions, subjects were 
Experimenting on Contextualism: Between-Subjects vs. Within-Subjects              11 
 
more likely to judge that the target utterance is true in the acceptance 
context (M = 4.52; SD = 0.95) than in the rejection context (M = 3.53; 
SD = 1.57). This replicates the result obtained for the Milk scenario in 
the H&C study. However, the size of the observed contextualist effect is 
considerably smaller in my experiment. Instead of judging that the utter-
ance in the rejection context is false, subjects’ answers for this context 
were rather ambivalent. Main results of the experiment for the Milk sce-
nario are illustrated in the chart below. 
 
Chart 1. Mean ratings in different contexts and orders of presentation 
for the Milk scenario. 
4,33
3,03
4,69
4,00
2,00
2,75
3,50
4,25
5,00
Acceptance Context 
Total: M = 4.52
Rejection Context 
Total: M = 3.53
Order A-R (N =
30)
Order R-A (N =
32)
 
The interaction between context and order of presentation reached the 
level of statistical trend – F(1, 60) = 3.74; p = 0.058; η2 = 0.059. Thus, 
the order in which opposite contexts were presented influenced to some 
degree the judgments given by subjects. Post-hoc comparisons (based on 
Bonferroni correction) of the evaluations for each context between or-
ders of presentation revealed that while priming did not affect the judg-
ments concerning the acceptance context (no prime: M = 4.33; primed: 
M = 4.69), it did significantly change the answers for the rejection con-
text (no prime: M = 4.0; primed: M = 3.03). Subjects who first got famil-
iar with the acceptance context were much more reluctant to accept the 
target utterance in the rejection context than respondents who started 
with evaluating the rejection context. 
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Most interestingly, however, the contextual shift in truth-evaluations 
obtained for related measurements did not remain in case of the between-
subject comparisons. An adequate t-test comparison did not reach the 
threshold for statistical significance – t(60) = 1.12; ns. In their first evalua-
tions (without priming), subjects were similarly likely to accept the target 
utterance in the acceptance context (M = 4.33; SD = 1.03) and in the re-
jection context (M = 4.0; SD = 1.30). Perceiving the contrast between op-
posite contexts was therefore necessary for the contextual effect to appear. 
 
III. 4. 2. Weight 
Similarly with the case of the Milk scenario, a significant main within-
subject effect of context was also obtained for the Weight scenario – F(1, 
64) = 72.81; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.532. When subjects were able to see the dif-
ference between contexts, they were much more likely to accept the target 
utterance in the acceptance context (M = 4.44; SD = 0.90) than in the re-
jection context (M = 2.97; SD = 1.47). It is worth noting that the size of 
this effect was bigger than the observed effect in the Milk scenario (see the 
η2 coefficient). Nevertheless, the judgments for the rejection context were 
not clearly negative, as predicted by contextualism, but rather ambivalent. 
Key results of the experiment for the Weight scenario are summa-
rized in the graph presented below. 
 
Chart 2. Mean ratings in different contexts and orders of presentation 
for the Weight scenario. 
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Apart from the main effect of context, a significant interaction of context 
and order of presentation was observed as well – F(1, 64) = 9.44; p = 
0.003; η2 = 0.129. This means that subjects’ judgments concerning differ-
ent context depended on the order of presentation. In analogy to the Milk 
scenario, the order of presentation had no influence on truth-evaluations 
made for the acceptance context (no prime: M = 4.50; primed: M = 4.39), 
but it made an important difference in case of the rejection context (no 
prime: M = 3.42; primed: M = 2.43). This last difference turned out to be 
significant according to an appropriate post-hoc Bonferroni test. 
Contrary to the pattern of results seen for the Milk scenario, the 
contextual shift in truth-evaluations with regard to the Weight scenario 
was observed for both within- and between-subject measurements. It 
turned out that when giving their first judgment, subjects who evaluated 
the acceptance context were significantly more happy to accept the target 
utterance (M = 4.50; SD = 0.90) than the ones who evaluated the rejec-
tion context (M = 3.42; SD = 1.34) – t(64) = 3.78; p < 0.001. It is worth 
noting, though, that even in this case the size of the contextualist effect 
observed for the between-subject design was considerably smaller than 
the analogous effect obtained for the within-subject design.5 
 
III. 5. Discussion 
At first glance, it may seem like the data collected in my first exper-
iment confirms the results obtained by H&C; therefore, providing fur-
ther empirical support to contextualism. As we have seen, at least for the 
within-subject design, both tested scenarios – Milk and Weight – elicited a 
contextual shift in truth-evaluation. The strength of this effect was not as 
robust as contextualists would like it to be, but, nevertheless, the ob-
served tendency seems to be much more in accordance with contextual-
ism than invariantism. 
After further consideration however, the results of my experiment 
confirm that, as one might have expected basing on previous observa-
tions, the judgments elicited by context shifting experiments do in fact 
depend on whether subjects have the opportunity to directly see the con-
trast between contexts. The divergence of judgments given for opposite 
contexts was considerably bigger for the within-subject design than for 
the between-subject design in case of both the Milk and Weight scenarios. 
When it comes to the former scenario a significant difference between re-
jection and acceptance contexts was observed only for related measure-
ments, so seeing the contrast between contexts was necessary for the 
contextual shift to appear. It looks as if, at least in some situations, our 
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conclusions concerning empirical support to contextualism may depend 
on the method we choose to measure folk intuitions. 
Moreover, it is worth considering the way in which the order of 
presentation of contexts influenced the judgments given by the subjects. 
The comparably strong within-subject contextual effects obtained for 
both Milk and Weight scenarios were mostly ‘produced’ by the judgments 
given by subjects who first got familiar with the acceptance context and 
then evaluated the rejection context. The truth-evaluations given for the 
acceptance context were insensitive to priming with the opposite con-
text. In case of the rejection contexts subjects were much more reluctant 
to accept the target utterance when their judgment was primed with the 
presentation of the acceptance context. It seems that these results reveal 
an interesting bias towards giving positive judgments in the first evaluat-
ed case among participants. It is much likely for the subjects to give a 
negative verdict in context shifting experiments if the rejection context is 
contrasted with the acceptance context, but initially they rather tend to 
give positive judgments. 
What conclusions should we draw from the observed differences 
between rival experimental designs and influence of order of presenta-
tion on intuitions elicited by context shifting experiments? Should we 
follow Nat Hansen (2014) and claim that the within-subject design gen-
erates better data for the purpose of assessing contextualism empirically, 
because, as he argues, it helps subjects in understanding how meaning is 
subject to context of utterance? On the contrary, I will question the 
claim that the additional divergence between judgments for different 
contexts observed in within-subject experiments are to be taken as a 
support to contextualism. Therefore, I will argue that when seeking evi-
dence in support of contextualism, we should rather focus on the results 
of between-subject experiments.  
The first reason to oppose the abovementioned claim of Nat Hansen 
is the fact that the most prominent proponents of contextualism [e.g. 
Recanati (2010); DeRose, (1992)] do not mention the influence of contrast 
between contexts on meaning among the main theses of contextualism. 
In fact, as Hansen (2014) points out, when contextualists introduce 
thought experiments in support of their view, they usually present differ-
ent contexts of utterance by directly contrasting them. But, regardless of 
this, the core claim of contextualism is that meaning is subject to the 
context of utterance per se, not to the contrast between different possible 
contexts of utterance. The latter could be the crucial factor for some 
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contrastivist view instead. This is a theoretical reason to have doubts 
about Hansen’s (2014) main methodological suggestion. 
The second argument against the use of within-subject design in 
experiments concerning contextualism is that the difference between ri-
val experimental designs observed in my study should not be explained 
in terms of context of utterance, but rather some other factors. 
Even if we agree with the supporters of contextualism that the addi-
tional divergence in judgments observed in within-subject studies is in fact 
a sign of contextual influence on meaning, the reason for preferring the 
between-subject design would remain. When we are interested in finding 
empirical evidence in favor of contextualism, we should be investigating 
whether the context of utterance affects the meaning of the statement in 
question. However, what the within-subject design “adds” to the results 
obtained in case of the between-subject design should be rather explained 
in terms of the context of evaluation, if to be seen as a contextual effect at 
all. Seeing the contrast between compared contexts is not a factor operat-
ing at the level of context of utterance, but the context of evaluation (the 
context of the experimental procedure). So, the effects observed in exper-
iments based on related measurements may be jointly produced by two 
different contextual phenomena, which should not be confused. 
However, I believe that another plausible approach to the results of 
my experiment should be formulated in invariantist, rather than contextual-
ist terms. The participants of within-subject experiments become familiar 
with pairs of descriptions of very similar situations that upon direct com-
parison clearly differ in some respects. The crucial parts – the utterance and 
the question concerning its truth value – on the other hand, remain the 
same. If we consider some well-known theories of pragmatic phenomena, 
such as Grice’s (1975) account of conversational maxims, we should expect 
that such an experimental setting would increase the tendency of subjects 
to differentiate their judgments. However, this tendency will not be due to 
the context of evaluated utterance, but rather to what subjects might believe 
is implicated by the crucial question addressed by the experimenter. The 
Gricean account of conversational maxims was initially proposed for sen-
tences in indicative mood, but it could be easily generalized to questions. 
The Maxim of Quantity for questions could, for example, prevent speakers 
from asking the same question more than once if the speaker has no reason 
to expect to gain more information as a result. Note, however, that being 
asked the exact same question twice (but in slightly different circumstances) 
is exactly what happens to participants of within-subject context shifting 
experiments. Due to standard conversational practices, subjects might have 
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assumed that different answers are expected by the experimenters, otherwise 
they would not ask the question twice. Therefore, the within-subject design 
might have simply encouraged the respondents to look for such a reading 
of the crucial question, on which the differentiation of their answers would 
be justified. But in such cases there is no guarantee that all subjects in fact 
expressed their verdicts concerning truth-conditions of the target utterance, 
instead of, for example, their warranted assertability.  
The above suggestions are of course, purely speculative and, at least at 
this point, I am not in possession of any independent empirical evidence in 
support of my claim. However, the above considerations show that it’s pos-
sible to, at least in principle, give an explanation of data seemingly support-
ing contextualism in invariantist terms. Adopting the same strategy to 
discard data supporting contextualism collected using between-subject de-
sign would be much more difficult. In other words – my argumentation 
shows that context-shifting experiments that use within-subject design do 
not allow to empirically distinguish between contextualism and invariantism. 
In order to further support my doubts about using within-subject de-
sign in experiments concerning contextualism I decided to run a follow-up 
experiment. My secondary experiment aimed at showing that in some cas-
es contrasting scenarios can not only strengthen the effects observed when 
there’s no contrast at play, but also completely change the evaluation of a 
context in comparison to the condition with no contrast at all. 
 
 
IV. SECOND STUDY 
 
IV. 1. Experimental Design 
While in my first study the within-subject design contrasted ac-
ceptance and rejection contexts with each other, for the purpose of the 
second experiment I created a third kind of context and decided to con-
trast it with the two others. The contexts of this type, which we may call 
uncertainty contexts, were intentionally designed to elicit ambivalent intui-
tions – it is really far from clear what is the truth-value of the target ut-
terance in this case (for more details see Appendix).  
The experiment aimed at comparing subjects’ verdicts concerning 
the uncertainty context in three different conditions: 1) when it was con-
trasted (primed) with the acceptance context; 2) when it was contrasted 
(primed) with the rejection context; 3) when it was not contrasted with 
any context whatsoever (no priming). Each subject was randomly as-
signed to one of these conditions, so the comparison was based on a 
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full-blown between-subject design, fitting a simple one-factor ANOVA 
model. Note that such an experimental procedure additionally allowed 
evaluating the size of the contextual effect between acceptance and rejec-
tion contexts (for independent measurements). The design of the exper-
iment for each tested scenario is illustrated in the graph below. 
 
Graph 2. The experimental design for each scenario in the second study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All other methodologicalaspects of the second study were similar to the 
first experiment I discussed above. Even though the second study tested 
two different scenarios (triplets of contexts), I present in detail only one 
of them, since the results obtained for the other one did not confirm the 
expectations. 
 
IV. 2. Participants 
Subjects were recruited from internet users registered as ‘workers’ 
on the Amazon Mechanical Turk website <www.mturk.com>. Each par-
ticipant was paid $0.3 for taking the survey. 
In total, 143 respondents filled in the survey6. 12 of them, however, 
reported having a degree in philosophy (BA or higher), admitted not being 
native English speakers or failed to answer comprehension questions cor-
rectly. Further statistics concern answers provided by 131 participants. 
71% of subjects were male, 29% were female. The age of participants 
ranged from 19 to 57, with the average equalling 30.18 (and standard devi-
ation equal 7.42). The majority of subjects, 65.4%, were 31 years old or 
younger.  
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IV. 3. Results 
In order to check whether subjects reacted to the uncertainty con-
text differently depending on the experimental condition, I subjected the 
data to a simple one-way ANOVA analysis. It turned out that priming 
influenced subjects’ judgments – F(2, 128) = 26.43; p < 0.001. Post-hoc 
tests (based on Bonferroni correction) revealed significant differences (p 
< 0.05) between all pairs of conditions. When there was no prime in-
volved, subjects gave ambivalent answers with an average equal to 3.16 
and considerable variance (SD = 1.24). Subjects were less likely to accept 
the target utterance if the presentation of uncertainty context was primed 
with evaluation of the acceptance context (M = 2.16; SD = 1.13) and, 
accordingly, more likely to accept it if they first assessed the rejection 
context (M = 3.95; SD = 1.08). This means that the context of uncer-
tainty elicited different reactions depending on whether it was primed, 
and how it was primed.7 
The experiment also provided data allowing for a between-subject 
comparison of acceptance and rejection contexts. In this respect a signif-
icant and considerably robust contextualist effect was observed. Subjects 
tend to accept the claim ‘There is gasoline in the garage’ much less will-
ingly in the rejection context (M = 2.41; SD = 1.37) than in the ac-
ceptance context (M = 4.58; SD = 0.73) – t(85) = 9.19; p < 0.001. The 
results are summarized in the graph below. 
 
Chart 3. Mean ratings in different contexts and orders of presentation in 
the second experiment. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
As the results of my second experiment show, in some cases con-
trasting one context with different vignettes can make people react to this 
context in a significantly different way. This observation is extremely im-
portant when discussing the choice of proper experimental design for ex-
perimenting on contextualism. The first experiment proved that non-
philosophers’ verdicts regarding different rejection contexts were similarly 
subject to priming. This means priming caused a rise in differences be-
tween judgments for acceptance and rejection contexts. Here, the influ-
ence of contrasting contexts is along the lines of contextualist predictions. 
Some philosophers argue that this procedure should be used in experi-
ments on contextualism because it helps collect more reliable data. I al-
ready presented some arguments against that claim, but when it comes to 
the role contrasting contexts play in the case of my second experiment, the 
picture becomes even more complicated. Which judgments concerning the 
uncertainty context given by the participants of my second study are more 
reliable – the ones given by subjects who first assessed the acceptance con-
text, or the ones who first evaluated the rejection context? It seems that 
there is no clear answer to this question. Maybe the right answer is that 
neither of them are fully reliable, and if we want to draw conclusions about 
folk intuitions concerning the truth-value of sentences in different conver-
sational contexts, we should rather focus on judgments that weren’t influ-
enced by any specific contrast.  
Unfortunately, this interesting pattern of results for uncertainty 
contexts was observed only in case of one of the scenarios tested in my 
experiments. Nevertheless, the result discussed above proves at least that 
it is possible to obtain such a result if we adopt a within-subject design of 
an experiment on this issue8. 
One more thing needs to be said – it is not the case that the results 
of my experiments undermine the main claim made by H&C. Their key 
conclusion that contextualism receives quite a lot of support from folk 
intuitions can be seen in the data collected by my experiments. In the 
cases of Weight and Puddle of Gasoline scenarios significant and robust be-
tween-subject contextualist effects were observed. The only claim that I 
tried to challenge here is the one according to which within-subject con-
text shifting experiments is a proper method for testing contextualism 
within the framework of experimental philosophy. I think that the argu-
ments presented in this paper should make us skeptical about this idea. 
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APPENDIX – VIGNETTES PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
Milk – Acceptance Context  
Hugo has been given the task of cleaning the refrigerator. He has just 
changed out of his house-cleaning garb, and is settling with satisfaction into 
his armchair, book and beverage in hand. The refrigerator is devoid of milk 
except for a puddle of milk at the bottom of it. Odile opens the refrigera-
tor, looks in, closes it and says to Hugo, ‘There is milk in the refrigerator’.  
Please evaluate Odile’s utterance ‘There is milk in the refrigerator’ using 
the scale below, where ‘1’ means ‘definitely false’ and ‘5’ - ‘definitely true’. 
 
Milk – Rejection Context 
Hugo is seated at the breakfast table, reading the paper. He prefers 
his coffee with milk. From time to time he looks dejectedly (but mean-
ingfully) at his cup of black coffee, which he is idly stirring with a spoon. 
The refrigerator is devoid of milk except for a puddle of milk at the bot-
tom of it. Odile says to Hugo, ‘There is milk in the refrigerator’. Please 
evaluate Odile’s utterance ‘There is milk in the refrigerator’ using the 
scale below, where ‘1’ means ‘definitely false’ and ‘5’ - ‘definitely true’. 
 
Weight – Acceptance Context 
80 kilograms is Hugo’s recommended weight. One morning, after 
months of dieting, he steps on the scale and it reads 80 kilograms. Later 
in the day, heavily dressed in winter clothes but without having eaten an-
ything, he is such that if he stepped on a scale, it would register 84 kilo-
grams. While wearing his heavy winter clothes, Hugo wants to announce 
the progress of his diet, and he says ‘I weigh 80 kilograms’. Please evalu-
ate Hugo’s utterance ‘I weigh 80 kilograms’ using the scale below, where 
‘1’ means ‘definitely false’ and ‘5’ - ‘definitely true’. 
 
Weight – Rejection Context 
80 kilograms is Hugo’s recommended weight. One morning, after 
months of dieting, he steps on the scale and it reads 80 kilograms. Later 
in the day, heavily dressed in winter clothes but without having eaten an-
ything, he is such that if he stepped on a scale, it would register 84 kilo-
grams. Hugo is out exploring the countryside while wearing his heavy 
winter clothes. He comes to a trestle bridge across a deep ravine. A sign 
says that the bridge is quite delicate and can bear only 80 kilograms or 
less. Hugo says to himself, ‘I weigh 80 kilograms’. Please evaluate Hugo’s 
utterance ‘I weigh 80 kilograms’ using the scale below, where ‘1’ means 
‘definitely false’ and ‘5’ - ‘definitely true’. 
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Puddle of Gasoline – Acceptance Context 
Mary and Gregory’s car ran out of fuel. Before Mary left, Gregory re-
filled the tank with the rest of the gasoline that they had in a canister. By 
accident, he spilled some of the gasoline onto the garage floor, leaving a 
small puddle. Except for the puddle, there is no more gasoline in the gar-
age. Gregory’s son, in exchange for borrowing his parents’ car, has been 
working to clean the garage. “It’s finished!” he says. Gregory takes a look 
into the garage to check on his son’s work. The puddle of gasoline is still 
on the floor. “Hey! There is gasoline in the garage!” Gregory yells. Please 
evaluate Gregory’s statement ‘There is gasoline in the garage’ using the 
scale below, where ‘1’ means ‘definitely false’ and ‘5’ - ‘definitely true’. 
 
Puddle of Gasoline – Uncertainty Context 
Mary and Gregory’s car ran out of fuel. Before Mary left, Gregory re-
filled the tank with the rest of the gasoline that they had in a canister. By ac-
cident, he spilled some of the gasoline onto the garage floor, leaving a small 
puddle. Except for the puddle, there is no more gasoline in the garage. 
Gregory hears a doorbell. It’s his neighbor, Ben, wearing a kitchen apron. 
‘Pal, I need your help. I need to light the fire in the barbecue. Do you have 
some gasoline?’ – He asks. ‘Yes. There is gasoline in the garage.’ – Gregory 
replies. Please evaluate Gregory’s statement ‘There is gasoline in the garage’ 
using the scale below, where ‘1’ means ‘definitely false’ and ‘5’ - ‘definitely 
true’. 
 
Puddle of Gasoline – Rejection Context 
Mary and Gregory’s car ran out of fuel. Before Mary left, Gregory re-
filled the tank with the rest of the gasoline that they had in a canister. By 
accident, he spilled some of the gasoline onto the garage floor, leaving a 
small puddle. Except for the puddle, there is no more gasoline in the gar-
age. A motorcycle stops in front of Gregory’s home. The owner of the 
motorcycle approaches Gregory and says, “Pardon me but I am running 
low on gasoline. May I borrow a small amount to reach the nearest gas sta-
tion?” “Yes. There is gasoline in the garage.” Gregory replies. Please eval-
uate Gregory’s statement ‘There is gasoline in the garage’ using the scale 
below, where ‘1’ means ‘definitely false’ and ‘5’ - ‘definitely true’. 
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NOTES 
 
1 This is a rough, simplified characterization for introductory purposes. 
For a more precise delineation, see the beginning of section II.1. below. 
2 From now on, I will use this abbreviation to refer to Hansen, Chemla (2013). 
3 Of course, it is possible to empirically distinguish between epistemic con-
textualism (as proposed by DeRose) and IRI (as proposed by Stanley). What 
matters for the former is the conversational context of the attributor, while in 
case of IRI the crucial factor is the practical interest of the subject to whom 
knowledge is ascribed. When the agent attributes knowledge to herself, both 
theories will give similar predictions. However, if the attributor and the agent to 
whom knowledge is ascribed are different persons, the predictions will diverge. 
Stanley (2005) presents variants of Bank Cases that illustrate this difference – Ig-
norant High Stakes, Attributor Low Stakes-Subject High Stakes, and Attributor High 
Stakes-Subject Low Stakes. Since context-dependence of knowledge attributions is 
not my main interest here, I will not discuss this issue in details, though. 
4 H&C used different names to call these contexts. In analogy to Bank Cases, 
where acceptance contexts are low-stakes, low-error salience cases and rejection 
contexts are high-stakes, high-error salience cases, they call these two categories 
‘low’ and ‘high’ context. I find these terms a bit confusing when it comes to color 
and miscellaneous scenarios, in case of which stakes and error salience plays no 
role, so I introduced more universal labels for the opposing contexts. 
5 Interestingly, these results were replicated for Polish speakers (in the 
study I used Polish translations of the scenarios). There were significant priming 
effects for both Milk (N = 75) and Weight (N = 78) scenarios. Similarly, as in the 
study described above, there were significant differences in subjects’ judgments 
between contexts for within-subject measurements in both tested cases. How-
ever, when it comes to between-subject measurements, the contextual effect was 
present only for Weight, but not for Milk, which is also in accordance with the 
data obtained from English speakers. It suggests that intuitions concerning con-
text-sensitivity might be stable across (at least some) ethnic languages. More 
cross-linguistic research on that topic would be interesting. 
6 In fact the sample size was bigger, but here I provide detailed statistics 
for only one scenario which yielded results confirming my expectations. 
7 The data presented here should be taken skeptically, as my recent at-
tempt to replicate these findings was not successful. During the publication pro-
cess, motivated by my initial results, I was trying to find more scenarios in case 
of which a similar pattern of priming for certainty contexts would occur. 
These attempts failed, which, in turn, led me to an attempted replication of the 
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second study presented here. The repeated study with a slightly bigger sample 
size (N=165) did not find a similar priming effect. As far as uncertainty contexts 
are concerned, the only observed difference was that subjects were slightly more 
likely to judge the target sentence true when there was no prime compared to 
those, who first evaluated the rejection context (which is an opposite effect to that 
observed in the initial study). The only effect that was replicated was a strong, 
between-subjects contextualist effect in evaluations regarding acceptance and re-
jection contexts. Thus, it seems that the divergence in judgments regarding un-
certainty contexts observed in the initial study was not due to priming, but it 
was rather a pure effect of uncertainty. Most probably, non-philosophers do not 
have strong and certain intuitions about these kind of cases, which results in in-
stability of their judgments. 
8 In the light of the abovementioned non-replication (see footnote 8.), it 
does not seem that Experiment 2. provides any genuine support to the main 
thesis of this paper. However, that does not spoil the central argument present-
ed here, as it rests mostly on the results of Experiment 1. The second study was 
only supposed to strengthen the argumentation, so even if we discard the data 
collected in Experiment 2., the argument remains.  
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